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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores a series of hypotheses from the modernization 
and world-system perspectives regarding the causes of changes in national 
political structure. We depart from the static tradition of cross-
national research and apply event-history methods to records on 90 
countries over the 1950-1975 period. We find that per capita gross 
national product, population, and ethnic diversity affect overall rates 
of political change. However, the effects are more complex than earlier 
quantitative research has shown. 
DYNAMICS OF FORMAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE: AN EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS 
The post-war period has not been a happy one for those who favor 
competitive national politics. The number of countries with multiparty 
politics declines and the number of one-party and military regimes seems 
to rise each year (see Sartori, 1976). This shift toward what Dahl 
(1971) calls hegemonic politics is such a striking feature of the modern 
period that the social science literature has begun to accept the trend 
as inevitable and unidirectional. The reality is more complex. The 
flow does not go only one way; some one-party and military regimes 
return to multiparty conditions. Understanding the nature of political 
change in the modern world requires analysis of the causes of the flows 
in both directions, into and out of hegemonic politics. 
Comparative sociology and political science have addressed these 
issues largely with case study and static methods. Most 
quantitative-comparative research still relies on cross-sectional 
associations, sometimes supplemented by aggregate-trend analyses. But 
when the change process is not near equilibrium, use of static methods 
reveals little about the causal structure. Me show that application of 
dynamic models and methods gives some important leverage for unraveling 
the various dimensions of political change. 
Our interest in this problem was stimulated by what we regard as the 
first serious attempt at quantitative study of the rise of hegemonic 
politics. Thomas et al. (in press) use a panel design to study the 
effects of a wide variety of factors on shifts towards state centralism. 
Though the panel methodology used by Thomas et al. is a step in the 
right direction, it does not fully exploit the information in the data 
— it ignores information on sequences and timing of changes. We 
reanalyze the same data uith more powerful methods, applying hazard rate 
analysis to the event histories. Ue have two aims. First, ue wish to 
explore further the causes of changes in national political structure 
over the 1950-1975 period. Second, we uant to illustrate the value of 
event-history methodology to macrosociological analysis. Its usefulness 
in the study of events in career histories of individuals has already 
been demonstrated (Tuma, 1976; Tuma, Hannan, and Groeneveld, 1979). We 
are not aware of any application of these methods to macrosociological 
problems. 
1. The<?rgtjcal Background 
An immense body of theory and speculation discusses the forces that 
change political structure. We note only the main lines of argument* 
concentrating on those that have an obvious bearing on the dynamics ue 
study. 
Most work on political change uses a general modernization theory, 
which holds that modernizing countries move along a single development 
trajectory previously traversed by the European liberal democracies. 
Any change that makes a peripheral nation more like one of the European 
states is assumed to increase the likelihood of "modern" competitive (or 
even "democratic") politics. One variant of modernization theory 
follows the lead of Lipset (1960) and focuses on the existence of 
"modern" cultural rules and modernizing institutions that prepare 
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individuals for effective political participation. The set of 
institutional arrangements that produce modern political capacities are 
thought to include a productive industrial economy, urbanism, modern 
schooling, etc. Thus nations with such characteristics ought to have 
more effective and stable oppositional politics. 
The role of economic development has received special attention 
within the modernization perspective. Dahl (1971:74) summarizes the 
modernization argument succinctly as follous: 
"A very general hypothesis will help, I think, to establish 
the connection between the political system and socioeconomic 
level: the chances that a country will develop and maintain a 
competitive political regime ... depend upon the extent to 
which the country's society and economy: (a) provide 
literacy, education, and communication; (b) create a 
pluralistic rather than a centrally dominated social order; 
(c) prevent extreme inequalities among the potentially 
relevant strata of the country." 
Oahl goes on to argue that advanced economies require efficient systems 
of communication and diverse specialized organizations (see also Almond 
and Powell, 1966). The creation of such structures "automatically 
distribute political resources and political skills to a vast variety of 
individuals, groups, and organizations" (Dahl, 1971:77). 
Decentralization of political skills presumably creates conditions for 
effective opposition to coercion and for the creation of 
special-interest movements. 
Ue hardly need to mention that the modernization perspective holds 
that development equalizes the distribution of valued outcomes. Extreme 
inequalities are thought to destabilize competitive politics. 
In recent years? the modernization perspective has been challenged by 
the uorld system perspective. Wallerstein (1974) argues that events are 
determined less by a country's internal structure than by its position 
in the world division of labor and by the discipline of the world 
market. Countries in different structural positions presumably face 
different constraints (that have mostly to do with the need for 
controlling different types of labor) and typically develop different 
political forms.' This perspective rejects the notion of a single 
development path. It argues instead that political change must be 
related to a country's role in the world division of labor. 
Thomas et al. (in press) have adapted this style of argument, 
focusing on institutional rules and power relations in the modern world 
system, to account for the spread of hegemonic state structures. They 
argue that modern states must increase productivity if they are to live 
up to the rules of the modern game. Poor states, especially those that 
serve as peripheral producers of low-wage products, face intense 
pressure to modernize. Elites in such countries typically resort to 
centralist strategies to speed up the process of economic growth. 
According to this view, once level of development (GNP per capita) and 
dependence in the world economy have been taken into account, education, 
urbanism, and other modernizing factors on political structure should 
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not affect political change. Thus, as Thomas et al. formulate the 
problem, there is a testable difference between the modernization and 
world system perspective. 
Finally, both perspectives agree that ethnic diversity destabilizes 
competitive politics. One view is that ethnic diversity creates 
conflict over fundamental values and that such conflict cannot be 
resolved through the usual process of political bargaining. Thus 
countries with ethnic diversity run a high risk of explosive conflict 
that often results in takeovers by one party or the military.
2
 Thomas et 
al. (in press) develop the argument differently. They argue that the 
existence of ethnic diversity gives lie to claims to a single national 
identity. The "moral boundary crisis" that results creates a need for 
symbols of unitary national authority. As Uallerstein (1966) argues, a 
hegemonic state is one solution to such a need. 
This brief review suggests that we focus on the role of the level of 
economic development,
3
 measures of the spread of modernizing 
institutions and organizations, structural position of countries in the 
world economy, ethnic diversity, and inequality in affecting movement 
among political forms. Due to paucity of data over the whole period 
(1950-1975) we do not study effects of inequality. Below we discuss our 
measures of each of the other dimensions. 
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2. Research Design 
Me concentrate on formal political organization and ignore political 
struggles and changes that occur within a form. Given our interest in 
formal hegemony.* the degree to which formal authority is located in a 
single organization in society, we devote special attention to states 
with only one party or in which parties have been abolished. The latter 
class includes military dictatorships. We distinguish both of these 
centralist forms from traditional no party states and from states that 
have some minimal level of formal political opposition in the 
governments states with two or more active (legal) parties.
5
 That is, we 
identify four forms of organizations 
1. Traditional no-party states: governments ruled by traditional 
rulers and traditional elites. These countries are usually 
monarchies (e.g., Libya, Jordan) and party organizations are 
illegal. 
2. Militarv regimes: states in which the military rules, whether 
or not parties have been abolished. There are two subclasses: 
(a) constitutional military rule (e.g., Ghana); and (b) 
military coups (e.g., Ethiopia). 
3. One-party states: states with only one legal party 
represented in the legislature (e.g., China, Czechoslovakia, 
U.S.S.R.); those with a single major party and several 
subordinates (e.g., Poland); and states in which a single 
party consistently dominates despite the legal existence of 
opposition parties (e.g., Mexico, Iran). 
- 6 -
4. flul tipartv states: the residual category which includes 
states with two parties or more.
6 
Ue use data from Banks (1977) to record moves among these four 
categories.
7
 In Table 3 below we report the coding of specific 
countries. 
The data give yearly readings on position in this category system for 
140 nations. Though Banks sometimes reports the date of the event 
(e.g., of a coup), dates are not available for all changes. Thus we 
associate events with the year in which they occur — our time unit is a 
year. 
Our measures of independent variables and sources are as follows: 
(a) level of economic development: gross national product per 
capita in constant 1973 U.S. dollars (IBRDUT); 
(b) spread of modern organizations and institutions' urbanism 
(UNDY), enrollments in primary, secondary, and teritary 
education (UNSY); 
(c) position in the world economy: export-partner concentration 
(UNYITS) -- see Chase-Dunn (1975) and Rubinson (1976) for 
discussions of the measurement and interpretation of this 
variable; 
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(d) ethnic diversity: the measure of ethno-1inguistic 
fractionalization presented by Taylor and Hudson (1972). 
Ue add as control variables: 
(e) population (UNOY); and 
(f) dummy variables for region: Africa, Asia, Central and South 
America. 
Measures of all these variables are available for only 90 of the 140 
countries for which measures on the dependent variable are available. 
3. Methods Q± Analysis 
Ue begin by discussing several conventional approaches to analyzing 
data such as these. Ue show how our methodology differs from common 
practice, and in particular how our procedures differ from those used by 
Thomas et al. 
A. Panel Analysis: Table 1 records the data in the conventional 
panel framework: a cross-tabulation of destination by origin for the 
1950-1975 period.® It shows a sharp rise in military regimes and 
one-party states over the 25-year period, as we remarked at the outset. 
Indeed 76/C of the newly-independent states end up in one of the two 
centralist forms. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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We are mainly interested in testing hypotheses about the causes of 
these changes. Thus the data in Table 1 must be related in some fashion 
to measures of the various independent variables listed above. The 
social science literature suggests three strategies for such analysis. 
Most current uork on analyzing tables such as Table 1 uses log-linear 
models for counted data (see, for example, Hauser, 1977). If our 
independent variables were categorical, these methods might be 
appropriate. But, since some of our causal variables are quantitative, 
we would lose much information by breaking them into discrete 
categories. 
The most common alternative to categorical analysis uses regression 
analysis or a close relative (e.g., logit analysis). Use of readily 
available and conventional procedures requires that the outcome space in 
Table 1 be collapsed into dichotomies. Thomas et al. follow this 
strategy. They collapse tables like Table 1 in two different ways. For 
one outcome, called state centralism, they combine states 1, 2, and 3 
into one category and put those in state 4 into another. This procedure 
gives dummy variables for origin and destination. A second procedure 
defines a variable called military regime, which treats state 2 as a 
distinct category, i.e., distinguishes (2) from (1, 3, 4). Thomas et 
al. regress each dummy variable on its lagged value and one or more 
measures of socioeconomic structure of the country. 
Of course the analyses of the two outcome measures are not 
independent. We cannot tell whether effects on state centralism simply 
repeat effects shown for the military regimes since some of the same 
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cases appear in each outcome. This method also does not deal with the 
constraints on discrete outcomes (see Hanuschek and Jackson, 1975, Chap. 
7 for details on these problems). 
Both these defects can be remedied by using logit (or probit) 
analysis procedures for multiple, discrete outcomes (polytomies) — see 
Nerlove and Press (1973). Adopting such an approach would, however, 
require extensive retooling. In view of the weaknesses of the panel 
approach (see below), we do not apply this strategy for the problem at 
hand. 
The panel framework wastes some of the information available in these 
data; it ignores sequences and timing of events (see Hannan and Tuma, in 
press). We pay a high price for disregarding such information. To see 
this we must be more explicit about the process that generates events 
(changes in political forms). The process of change in political forms 
has at least two properties: changes may occur at any time (there is no 
fixed lag time in the process); and randomness plays a central role. 
Therefore the most natural modeling framework is the class of 
continuous-timfe stochastic processes with discrete-state space. In this 
framework, the panel data consist of observations at two arbitrary times 
of the states of N (independent) stochastic processes — observation 
records with g a p s . We normally assume all N units have the same 
process, so that we think of the data as N replications of the same 
process. The fundamental difficulties uith the panel framework in this 
context concern embedding and model identification. Singer and 
Spilerman (1976 a,b) prove that a two-wave panel does not provide enough 
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information to uniquely identify an underlying process even under highly 
restrictive assumptions (e.g., invoking the Markov property). This is 
not an estimation problem; it is a more fundamental, logical difficulty. 
If ue hope to identify and estimate models for political events, ue 
must exploit more of the information in the data. The remainder of the 
paper discusses the more detailed information and uses it to estimate 
causal effects. 
B. Analysis of Transitions: Table 2 reports data in a form similar 
to that of Table 1 except that the entries count all observed 
transitions between states. Due to multiple changes for many countries, 
we observe 206 transitions. Table 2 tells a rather different story from 
Table 1. Not surprisingly it gives the impression of much greater 
movement. Notice how much smaller than in Table 1 are the counts on the 
main diagonal. For example, Table 1 shows that 72% of the countries 
that began with multiparty systems had the same form of organization 25 
years later. Table 2 tells that only 4955 of the spells that begin in 
the multiparty category do not move to some other form. In addition we 
see that new states (those becoming independent after 1950) have a 
distribution of initial forms that is quite different from the array of 
1975 outcomes (compare the bottom rows in the two tables). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Inclusion of data on transitions gives slightly more leverage for 
model identification. But we have not come close to using all the 
information. 
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C. Event Sequences: Table 2 does not follow individual countries. 
Consequently, we cannot tell which multi-step patterns of movement occur 
most commonly. This gap is filled by Table 3 which records the 30 
distinct sequences of moves we observe. The most frequent patterns are 
stable multiparty and colony to multiparty. There is also a good deal 
of movement back and forth between multiparty and military. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Suppose that the parameters of the underlying stochastic process are 
constant, i.e., that there is no heterogeneity in transition rates due 
to social structural variations among countries. In this extreme 
simplification, one can use event sequences directly to test among 
classes of models. For example, Singer (1977) shows how to test the 
Markov property (see below) with straightforward conditional probability 
arguments (see also Billingsley (1961) and Goodman (1968)). 
Some simple calculations of various conditional probabilities show 
that multi-step moves involving transiting between multiparty and 
military do not fit a constant rate Markov model. If we assumed that 
the rates were indeed constants over all N units (i.e., no population 
heterogeneity), these calculations would force us to abandon the Markov 
assumption. However, we suppose that social structural differences do 
indeed affect transition rates, and the rates are thereby not constant. 
In this context the Markov property cannot be tested quite so simply. 
Some of the apparent dependence on history may reflect the continued 
operation of stable causal variables that we include in the analysis 
reported below. Unfortunately, we do not have enough cases to conduct 
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causal analysis separately for various sequences so that ue can do a 
full-bloun test of the Markov property given heterogeneity. Belou ue 
discuss an analysis strategy that addresses this issue indirectly albeit 
partially. 
0. Event-History Analysis: An event history adds information on 
timing to an event sequence. The main value of using event histories is 
that the identification problem discussed above does not arise in such 
an extreme form.' Me have discussed strategies for event-history 
analysis at length elseuhere (Tuma and Hannan, 1979; Tuma et al., 1979; 
Hannan and Tuma, in press). Here ue repeat only the minimally essential 
detai1s. 
Our approach is to state the dynamic process in terms of tuo sets of 
fundamental parameters: 
(a) the instantaneous transition rates: 
r
j k
( t ) = lim pj
k
(t,t+At)/At 
a-t^O 
where pjic(t,t+At) is an ordinary transition probability for 
movement from state j to k; and 
(b) the hazard function, the rate of leaving a state: 
rj(t) = - Z rjic(t) 
IT* 
Ue build causal effects into these parameters in the following general 
form: 
rjfc(t) = e x p U o + aiXi (t') + ••• + aX (t')| 
- 13 -
(1 ) 
where t' denotes the time of entry into the state occupied at t. Our 
goal is to estimate the a's, the effects of observable variables on 
transition rates (or on hazard f u n c t i o n s ) .
1 0 
Ue use specifications that differ on two dimensions: (1) Markov vs. 
more general forms of dependence on history; and (2) time homogeneity 
vs. time dependence. As is well known, the Markov property holds that 
history (the record of state occupancies) does not affect the future of 
the process once we take present state into account. Under the Markov 
assumption we may pool all the spells ennumerated in Table 2 into a 
single analysis. Ue report such analyses and label them "all-spell" 
analyses. If the Markov assumption does not hold, it is not legitimate 
to pool spells for the same country and history must be taken into 
account. Ue do not have enough observations to conduct any extensive 
non-Markovian analysis. Instead, we report analyses that use only the 
first spells for each country (following 1950 or date of independence, 
whichever is later). If the first spell results differ substantially 
from those that use all spells, ue suspect that ignoring higher order 
dependence gives misleading qualitative conclusions regarding causal 
e f f e c t s .
1
' 
The second dimension in our design concerns assumptions about the 
variability of hazards over time. Ue take two approaches. In the first 
we assume that, conditional on levels of exogenous variables upon entry 
i 
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into a state (or 1950 whichever is later), the rates are constant. For 
this case, we use maximum-1 ike 1ihood estimators of the sort described by 
Tuma et al. (1979). Our second approach assumes a general, but unknown, 
form of time variation. Specifically, we assume that the hazard is: 
rj(t) = h(t) explBiXi(t') 
+ ••• + B|(X|f(t')l 
where h(t) is constant for all units. For this specification we use 
Cox's (1975) partial-likelihood analysis (see the discussion in Tuma and 
Hannan, 1978).
1 2
 Ue use Cox's estimator only to estimate effects on 
hazards (rates of leaving a state). Comparisons of Cox and 
maximum-likelihood estimators gives an indication of the likely 
importance of time variation (net of the time variation in the causal 
variables) and the likely noise in our maximum-likelihood estimates.
1 3 
E. Estimated Rates from Event-Histories: Before proceeding with 
causal analysis, ue report maximum-likelihood estimates of constant 
transition rates
1
* (assuming population homogeneity) for comparison with 
the proportions in Tables 1 and 2. Recall that Table 2 counts all 
observed transitions but ignores timing. The event-history estimators 
use timing of changes to estimate rates. Thus any differences between 
Tables 2 and 4 shows that ignoring timing makes a substantive 
difference. The relevant rates are reported in Table 4. Panel A gives 
rates using all spells; panel B reports rates estimated only from first 
spells. The largest off diagonal cells in Table 2 involve moves from 
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military to multiparty, the reverse move, and one party to military. 
These are also the largest rates in Table 4. There are relatively high 
rates of flou into military (first column in Tables 4 a,b) but even 
higher rates of flow out (first row). Flows out of two party are larger 
than flows in, which are indeed quite small. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Using data on timing of events makes a difference. In Table 2, which 
ignores timing, the percent flows from multiparty to military and back 
are fairly similar. In Table 3 these two rates are quite different; the 
flow rate from military to multiparty is more than double the magnitude 
of the reverse flow. 
Table 4 allows us to evaluate Huntington's (1968) claims about the 
relative stability of the political forms.
1 5
 He argues that no party, 
military, and multiparty systems lack the institutional support 
necessary for stability, but that the one-party system is inherently 
more stable. Huntington also claims that multiparty systems are more 
likely than one-party states to undergo military coups. The panel data 
in Table 1 appear to support these assertions; one-party systems show 
the least movement (relative frequency of .25) and are only half as 
likely as multiparty states to be military regimes in 1975 (relative 
frequency of .12 vs. .23). These results, however, are spurious and 
arise solely because the panel design has ignored important information, 
as can be seen in Tables 2 and 4. In Table 2 the one-party form appears 
to be the most stable (relative frequency .50), but its degree of 
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stability is indistinguishable from that of other forms (military, the 
least stable, has a "staying" frequency of .48). Further, movement from 
one party to military becomes more likely (.47 vs. .39) than movement 
from multiparty to military. When the rates for each origin state are 
summed in Table 4, the multiparty form is most stable (.043) and the 
one-party state ranks third (.049). Only the military form is less 
stable than one party. In addition, the rate of movement from one party 
into military is higher than the same rate for multiparty origins (.046 
vs. .033). When the data are properly analyzed, Huntington's claims are 
shoun to be wrong on two counts. First, the one-party form is no more 
stable than the others. In fact, it may be less stable. Second, the 
multiparty form is apparently no less susceptible to military coups than 
the one-party state. 
4. Causal Analy?i? 
Before presenting our main findings, we review the results of Thomas 
et al., who sought to arbitrate between the two competing accounts 
discussed earlier. Thomas et al.'s panel regressions reveal consistent 
negative effects of per capita GNP on state centralism. This finding 
holds both when centralism is measured as military rule and when 
military regimes and one-party states are combined into one category. 
This finding does not help distinguish between the modernization and 
world-system perspectives as both predict that national wealth retards 
movement towards centralism. But while Thomas et al. find no evidence 
that other modernizing experiences (urbanism, schooling, etc.) affect 
centralism, they do find that two measures of national dependence 
- 17 -
(export-partner concentration and investment dependence) significantly 
increase centralism. Thus they conclude that the data favor the 
uorld-system perspective. 
Ue explore the effects of most of the same independent variables.
1 6 
Like Thomas et al. ue study the 1950-1975 period. Ue chose not to 
collapse categories of political forms, however. Some of the 
differences between our analysis and Thomas et al.'s may reflect this 
difference. In general, we think that the results presented below 
diverge from those of Thomas et al. largely because we have used a more 
appropriate model and estimation procedures. 
Ue begin with simple models and gradually increase complexity. 
First, we estimate effects on overall rates of movement (averaging over 
both origins and destinations). Then we consider effects on rates of 
movement out of particular forms (averaging over destinations) and then 
on rates of movement into forms (averaging over origins). These 
analyses would generally be less useful than a complete origin by 
destination analysis. Unfortunately, our sample is too small to 
reliably estimate effects on 12 distinct transition rates. Ue have 
nonetheless performed such analysis and discuss the findings briefly. 
However, we focus most attention on the results of the simpler 
procedures. 
A. Effects an Changes of al1 Types: First, we analyze whether the 
measured socioeconomic conditions affect overal1 rates of movement among 
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political forms. Only four of the variables ue examined had significant 
effects:
1 7
 GNP per capita, population, ethnic diversity, and region (a 
set of dummy variables). Table 5 gives the relevant findings. Both 
uealth (or productivity) and population decrease rates of political 
change. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
We pay particular attention to the GNP effect. The estimates in Table 5 
imply huge differences in rates of political change betueen various 
levels of development. Figure 1, uhich relates per capita GNP to the 
multiplier of the base rate given by the constant and the levels of 
other independent variables (see equation [1]), makes this plain. Given 
the conventional demarcation betueen developed and developing countries 
at roughly $1000 GNP per capita. Figure 1 implies strong effects of 
changes in GNP over the uhole range of development. At the same time, 
the curve suggests that GNP has little effect on rates of political 
change among developed or core countries. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The close agreement betueen maximum-likelihood and partial-1ikelihood 
estimates,'
8
 suggests that causal effects are not confounded uith 
possible temporal variation in rates of political change due to 
uorld-system processes. The situation is less simple regarding the 
comparison of analyses using only first spells uith those using all 
spells. It makes little difference uhich design ue use to estimate the 
GNP effect and slightly more difference for the effect of population. 
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Both effects are stronger in the first-spell analysis. Quite the 
opposite occurs with the other two effects. In the all-spells analysis, 
both ethnic diversity and regional terms have significant effects. The 
diversity effect is also quite strong; it implies a tuo and a half fold 
increase in the rate betueen the minimum and maximum values of diversity 
ue observe (see Figure 2). Houever, neither diversity nor region have 
significant effects in the first-spells analysis. These findings 
suggest that ethnically diverse countries contribute disproportionately 
to multiple changes of political form. It does not, houever, appear to 
affect the rate of changing at all. This difference in findings betueen 
methods may also mean that the Markov assumption is not appropriate 
here. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here! 
B. Effects on Movement Out of Speci fic States: Next ue disaggregate 
spells by origin and repeat analyses such as those in Table 5 for each 
origin category. Thomas et al.'s analysis suggests that the GNP effect 
uill vary sharply by origin. According to their argument, richer 
nations should be less likely to move out of noncentralist forms and 
more likely to move out of centralist forms. Our results are quite 
different. GNP has a stronger effect on the rate of moving out of the 
one-party form than on the rate of leaving the multiparty form. At the 
same level of uealth, one-party states are at least as likely as states 
uith multiple parties to retain their form of organization. National 
uealth has small and insignificant effects on rates of movement from 
military regimes and tuo-party states. 
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\ 
An interesting difference concerning the effect of ethnic diversity 
can be seen in Tables 6 and 7. Whereas Table 5 showed that 
ethnically-diverse states are more likely to change political forms. 
Tables 6 and 7 show that the effect holds particularly for multiparty 
states. Apparently, states with high ethnic diversity and a political 
structure that legitimates political organization of such diversity are 
especially unstable. On the other hand, it appears that ethnic 
diversity decreases the rate of leaving the one-party category (see 
Table 7). Ethnically-diverse states are likely to transit from the 
multiparty form. If they move to a one-party form, they are likely to 
retain this political form. 
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here] 
Notice in Table 6 that none of the variables have any substantial (or 
significant) impact on the rate of abandoning military rule. In 
particular, military regimes, unlike nonmilitary centralist states, do 
not benefit in terms of stability from national productivity. 
C. Effects on Entering Cateoories; Next we reverse our procedure and 
examine effects on flows into the four categories, ignoring origins. 
The relevant findings appear in Table 8. These results support the 
arguments of Thomas et al. GNP per capita lowers rates of moving into 
the two centralist forms, military and one party. Moreover, there is a 
suggestion of a positive effect of GNP on rates of transition to the 
multiparty form (only in the analysis of first spells). 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
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The most striking finding in Table 8 is the impact of ethnic 
diversity on flows into the one-party form. Take the smaller estimate 
of this effect, in Panel B. It implies that the rate for countries 
close to the mean on diversity (.5) is more than two and a half times 
larger than for completely homogeneous countries; countries close to the 
maximum (with diversity scores of .9) have an estimated rate six times 
larger. Ethnic diversity appears to exert a strong force on movement 
towards one-party rule. 
D. Effects an Specific Transition Rates: Finally, we turn to the 
detailed findings regarding causal effects on specific transitions. 
Even ignoring the no-party form, there are 12 distinct transitions and 
thus 12 sets of parameters to be estimated. Consequently, we get rather 
imprecise estimates of effects. We do not report the estimates but 
instead discuss the patterns that appear. 
On the whole, the detailed findings suggest that our results on rates 
of leaving states (ignoring destinations) and on rates of entry 
(ignoring origins) give a reasonably accurate picture of the process. 
Recall that we find that GNP and population depress rates of movement 
and also lower rates of entry into centralist forms. These patterns 
continue in the detailed analysis. The only new piece of information is 
that per capita GNP lowers the rate of military coups for one-party 
states (indeed this effect is the strongest and most significant GNP 
effect in the set). National wealth also affects movement betueen the 
two centralist forms. 
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There is no clear pattern for effects of ethnic diversity. Me find a 
very strong effect (4.43) for moves from multiparty to one party. But 
ue also find that ethnic diversity significantly increases the rate of 
transition from military to one party. Thus ethnic diversity favors 
one-party rule generally. However, the effect is strongest for 
multiparty states. 
5. Discussion 
This analysis agrees partly uith that of Thomas et al. Both studies 
find no evidence that modernizing experiences and institutions affect 
rates of change in political forms. The absence of such effects is not 
especially informative; ue can think of a great number of reasons 
(beginning uith problems of measurement of modernizing experience) why 
these research designs are not well suited to detecting such impacts. 
The most interesting comparison of the panel and event-history 
analyses concerns the impacts of GNP per capita. The panel regressions 
support the common contention that development reduces the likelihood of 
political centralism. Our event-history analysis adds two additional 
dimensions to the analysis of these issues. First, we retain the 
distinctions among four distinct political forms; we do not collapse 
categories. Second, we look separately at effects on leaving a 
political form and at effects on movement into forms. 
Our analyses suggest that military regimes and one-party states have 
different dynamics. Two findings are notable in this respect. First, 
ethnic diversity increases the rate of movement into the one-party form 
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but does not affect the rate of military takeovers. Second, GNP has a 
significant negative effect on the rate of transition from one-party to 
military control. Both findings imply that ue should not consider these 
two forms as alternative indicators of hegemonic state organization. 
Our general findings regarding GNP effects agrees uith the panel 
regressions in one respect but disagrees in another. The tuo analyses 
agree uith respect to effects on movement touards centralism or 
hegemony. Richer countries are less likely to move from multiparty 
politics to one-party or military rule. In this respect the 
conventional uisdom appears correct. Houever, the literature does not 
anticipate our findings concerning the second aspect of the process of 
change, the rate of moving at all. Wg, find that countri es ui th high per 
caoi ta GNP are 1 ess 1ikelv to change poli tical forms, whatever the form. 
This effect holds uith equal force for the most common centralist form 
(one party) and for the decentralist form (multiparty). Put loosely, 
successful countries retain their political strategies. This result 
gives a very different image of the underlying dynamic process. It 
calls into question'the world-system arguments advanced by Thomas et al. 
Further, it clearly invalidates Huntington's (1968) claim that sustained 
modernization threatens the one-party system. 
There is another important difference betueen our findings and those 
of Thomas et al. Ue find no evidence that dependency, as measured by 
export-partner concentration, affects political stability or the 
direction of change. 
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Event-history methods (but not panel regressions) support the 
widespread belief that ethnic diversity destabilizes politics, 
especially competitive politics. However, the interpretation of this 
relationship is problematic. On the one hand, diversity may simply 
undermine political bargaining and explode coalitional politics as some 
political scientists argue. On the other hand, ethnically-diverse 
countries might have a greater need for overarching symbols of 
nationhood that can be filled only by a hegemonic state structure. Or, 
the relationship might be more contingent and dynamic. Elsewhere 
(Hannan, in press; see also Nielsen, 1977 and Olzak, 1978) we have 
argued that expansion of state structures may create the conditions for 
successful large scale ethnic resistance to the state. So alterations 
in the forms of political structure (especially towards formal hegemony) 
might create and intensify ethnic conflicts. These conflicts may in 
turn destabilize the political structure. Unfortunately, the data at 
hand does not contain sufficient detail on ethnic organization and 
collective action to permit more refined analyses of these issues. Ue 
think that this matter should have high priority in the continuing 
research on political change. 
Ue have found very close agreement between maximum likelihood and 
partial likelihood where both are defined. This agreement suggests 
several conclusions. First, there may be little variation over the 
25-year period in rates of leaving specific political forms. This 
conclusion differs from that of Thomas et al . who contrasted the 
1950-1960 and 1960-1975 periods. Second, our estimates of causal 
effects are relatively insensitive to the exact timing of events. Our 
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ML estimator uses exact timing while PL uses only information on the 
ordering of times of changes. 
We see larger differences regarding the other dimension of our 
design: first-spell versus all-spell analysis. As we suggested above, 
our results may imply a complex dependence on the history of the 
process. Neither of our estimators take history into account. 
Therefore, we view our findings as only a first approximation to a more 
complete analysis of these issues. Any such analysis will require use 
of more data than we used — this will undoubtedly require extending the 
data base further back into history. 
Finally, as panel regressions and event-history analysis give 
different qualitative findings for these issues, the choice between 
methodologies makes an important substantive difference. We argue that 
the methods used in this paper make better use of available data and 
provide a sounder footing for further research. 
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APPENDIX 
Fyngtigngl Isrm o f M E Effect 
Throughout the analysis ue have reported log-linear GNP effects. As 
Figure 1 shous, this specification implies that a unit increase in GNP 
per capita has its strongest impact near zero GNP and that the effect of 
a given change declines monotonical1y at each higher level. In this 
appendix ue compare estimates from the log-linear model uith those from 
a model uith a threshold. Ue use a function (r(t) = explaG
2
], uhere G 
is per capita GNP) that permits the relationship betueen GNP and the 
rate of political change to have a backuard S-shape. This permits 
increments in GNP to have small impacts on political stability for very 
poor as uell as very rich countries. 
All the qualitative conclusions of the paper are unchanged uhen ue 
use this alternative specification for the GNP effect. GNP still has a 
very substantial (and statistically significant) negative effect on the 
overall rate of movement. The effects of other variables are also 
unaffected by the change in the model. 
Still the tuo specifications give different impressions of the nature 
of the GNP effect. Figure A.1 plots the multipliers of the base rate of 
political change as functions of GNP for both specifications. The 
log-square form tells that there is almost no difference in rates of 
change betueen countries uith GNP's of $50 and $200; the curve is almost 
horizontal. The log-linear model implies a large difference in rates 
betueen these tuo levels of GNP. That is, the tuo specifications have 
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quite different implications about the relationship of GNP per capita to 
political stability for the least developed nations. 
[Insert Figure A.1 about here] 
Given this difference, ue uould like to use data to choose betueen 
the specifications. Since the tuo models are not hierarchically nested, 
ue cannot use classical hypothesis testing procedures to discriminate 
betueen them. The usual alternative procedure is to use calculated 
residuals for specification tests. Unfortunately, since r5k is not 
observable, ue cannot look directly at residuals (observed minus 
predicted rates). Instead ue use the fact that expected duration='/rj* 
and calculate observed minus predicted durations in states. Me can then 
search for relationships betueen residuals and levels of GNP to 
determine uhich curve in Figure A.1 fits the data better. But ue 
encounter another problem: censored observations do not have completed 
observations so ue can calculate residuals only over the uncensored 
spells. Clearly this amounts to selection on an endogenous 
characteristic and uill generally lead to systematic differences betueen 
selected and unselected samples. Nonetheless, ue overlook this defect 
in the procedure and calculate residuals for completed spells for 
countries in the range in uhich the specifications disagree (GNP<$1000). 
Clearly this procedure must be judged cautiously due to the omission of 
censored spelIs. 
The plots of calculated residuals by GNP per capita are shoun in 
Figure A.2 and A.3. Neither specification is a clear uinner. Rather 
the log-linear specification seems to predict someuhat better for the 
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lowest portion of the range (GNP < 200). It appears that changes in GNP 
below this level have a larger effect than the log-square model implies. 
But the log-square predicts better over the range from 200 to roughly 
800. So we are unable to use empirical methods to choose between the 
two simple specifications. Perhaps a more complex model can improve the 
fits we achieved. Given the substantive importance of the differences 
between these formulations, this matter deserves some attention. 
(Insert Figures A.2 and A.3 about here! 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. There is considerable debate uithin the broad world system 
perspective regarding the relationship betueen the state and the 
social structure. For example, Skocpol (1977) has critized 
Mailerstein for neglecting the specific dynamics of the state. A 
variety of vieus on this issue can be found in the papers collected 
by Tilly (1975) and by Meyer and Hannan (in press). 
2. The modernization perspective does not really have a satisfactory 
explanation of the destabilizing effects of ethnic diversity. It 
argues that modernization erodes primordial ethnic identities and 
defuses ethnic conflict. At the same time, theorists like Oahl 
argue that social diversity promotes competitive politics but that 
cultural pluralism favors hegemonic politics. But it is not clear 
uhy some kinds of pluralism have one effect and other types of 
pluralism have the opposite effect. 
3. Some readers have reminded us that one theme in the modernization 
perspective holds that rapid development is destabilizing because it 
raises expectations disproportionately to outputs (see especially 
Oeutsch, 1961 and Olson, 1963). Me have not tried to distinguish 
effects of levels of economic development from rates of change. It 
is not clear hou one should do so. Since virtually all countries 
have grouing economies, lack of grouth is tantamount to decline. 
Then hou large must the grouth rate be to destabilize the political 
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structure? The literature does not offer any clues. What is more, 
the rate of grouth in expectations may nou be largely uncoupled from 
national growth rates. Expectations may be set by world culture and 
transmitted by mass media (Meyer and Hannan, 1979). Moreover, a 
good deal of recent sociological research has cast doubt on the 
thesis that political erruptions reflect revolutions of rising 
expectations. Finally, most of the modernization literature does 
not make separate hypotheses about levels and rates of change in 
economic development. Thus our empirical analysis conforms to the 
most widespread version of the modernization argument. 
4. Our concern here is with formal aspects of political structure. 
Mhile formal structure no doubt constrains process, the relationship 
between formal structure and the character of politics is at best a 
weak one. In particular, formal structure may not imply a great 
deal about political participation, legitimacy of the state, 
political freedom, centralization of power in the state, etc. 
Formal structure does, however, determine whether certain dissident 
movements operate within existing political structures or 
underground. It may also tell something about the relationship 
betueen state and society (Swanson, 1971; Thomas et al., in press.) 
Ue treat formal patterns as interesting in their own right, while 
taking care not to suggest that changes in form imply anything about 
the quality of outcomes to citizens. 
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5. Political scientists typically make a major distinction between 
two-party and multiparty systems (see, e.g., Huntington (1968) and 
LaPalombara and Weiner (1966)). However, the literature does not 
agree about criteria for distinguishing these forms. This lack of 
agreement leads to many different coding schemes. For example, 
Blondel (1969) codes 21 countries as having two-party systems. 
Banks and Textor (1963) find 11. Sartori (1976:185) argues 
persuasively that a strict definition yields only three countries 
with two-party systems. For these reasons, we chose to ignore this 
distinction and classify all systems with two or more active parties 
as multiparty. 
6. At times, even the distinction betueen one-party and multiparty 
states breaks down. For example, India has been labelled a dominant 
party system (Duverger, 1960) even though the opposition often 
mobilizes a substantial popular vote. We have followed Sartori's 
(1976) suggestion to use average election return distances to define 
multiparty. If the majority party has a greater than 40% lead over 
the second party for tuo consecutive elections, ue code the country 
as one party. This rule places India in the multiparty category but 
puts Iran in the one-party category. For countries uhere election 
returns are unavailable, ue have used the party system 
classifications given by Sartori (1976), Banks and Textor (1963) and 
Banks (1977). Overall ue have attempted to reflect the consensus of 
the literature in our codings. 
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7. Ue do not study stability of regimes within forms. Thus if a 
military coup occurs within a country already ruled by another 
faction of the military, we do not code such an event. 
8. Ue could, of course, produce tables for other time periods. The 
logic of our argument does not depend on the periods of measurement, 
however. 
9. More precisely, event histories eliminate the identification problem 
as long as we restrict attention a priori to a certain class of 
models, e.g., Markov processes. 
10. Following Dahl's (1977:67-68) suggestion we also used another 
specification for the effect of GNP per capita that permits a 
threshold effect as well as a floor effect. This involves replacing 
GNP per capita with its square in equation (1) (see Hannan, Tuma, 
and Groeneveld, 1978). Ue obtain similar qualitative results from 
the two specifications and cannot clearly choose one over the other. 
In the text we report estimates from the pure log-linear model 
(equation (1)). In the appendix we contrast the findings from the 
two specifications. 
11. This comparison gives only a rough indication of a problem. If the 
process is indeed non-Markovian, even the first-spell analysis is 
misspecified due to the omission of the relevant historical data. 
On the other hand, misspecification of the causal structure or of 
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the nature of time variation in rates may also lead to differences 
betueen the tuo analyses. John Meyer (personal communication) has 
suggested that first spells for neu states may differ from other 
spells because the initial political form is imposed by the outgoing 
imperial ruler. For these reasons, comparison of first and all 
spells can at best identify problems that deserve further research. 
12. Ue obtained both maximum-likelihood and partial-1ikelihood estimates 
using Tuma's (1979) RATE program. The partial-likelihood extension 
uas developed by Barbara Warsavage. Cox's estimator has recently 
been extended to the case of multiple destinations (or competing 
risks), see Holt (1978) and Prentice et al. (1978). Ue have not yet 
implemented this extension, houever. 
13. Ue have also estimated models uith explicit time dependence (and 
uhich take into account changes in levels of independent variables 
during spells). Ue do not report results of these analyses since 
they did not significantly improve the fit relative to the simpler 
models. 
14. For this simple case, the maximum-likelihood equation has an 
explicit solution (given in Tuma and Hannan, 1978) so that estimates 
may be computed in a straightforuard uay. 
15. Huntington's argument separates tuo-party and multipary systems; 
houever, ue do not in the current discussion. Separate analysis 
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using this distinction does not yield substantially different 
conclusions. 
16. Me did not have access to measures of investment dependence (one of 
Thomas et al.'s measures of dependence) for enough countries for 
detailed analysis. Thus ue did not use this measure in our uork. 
17. Me use the .10 level of significance. For the convenience of 
readers uho prefer more stringent tests, ue have indicated the .05 
and .01 levels as uell. 
18. Me do not report estimates of a constant for PL. Recall from above 
that the equivalent of a constant for PL is h(t) a time-dependent 
function. 
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Table 1. Panel Observations on Political Form, 1950-1975. 
1975 
No party (1) Military (2) One party (3) Multiparty (4) 
No party (1) 1 1 0 0 2 
(.50) (.50) 
Military (2) 0 1 0 2 3 
(.33) (.67) 
One party (3) 0 1 6 1 8 
(.12) (.75) (.12) 
Multiparty (4) 0 9 2 28 39 
(.23) (.05) (.72) 
Colony (5) 1 14 15 8 38 
(.03) (.37) (.39) (.21) 
26 23 39 90 
Table 2. Counts of Transitions.' 
Destination 
No party (1) 
No party (1) 2 1 0 1 4 
(.50) (.25) (.25) 
Military (2) 0 22 7 17 46 
(.48) (.15) (.37) 
One party (3) 0 18 19 1 38 
(.47) (.50) (.03) 
Multiparty (4) 1 31 9 39 80 
(.01) (.39) (.11) (.49) 
Colony (5) 1 1 16 20 38 
(.03) (.03) (.42) (.53) 
73 51 78 206 
Counts on the main diagonal record observations that are censored, i.e., still in the 
state in 1975. 
Table 3. Transition Sequences of Political Structures by Country 
Sequence Frequency Countries 
12 
141 
2424 
24242 
2434 
3 
32 
323 
324 
4 
42 
423232 
424 
4242 
22 
6 
1 
4 
Afghanistan 
Nepal 
El Salvador 
Peru 
Thailand 
Mexico, Nicaragua, China, Taiwan, Spain 
Portugal 
Egypt 
Dominican Republic 
South Africa, Canada, Costa Rica, United States, India, 
Israel, Japan, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, West 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemborg, Netherlands, Norway 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Australia, Iceland 
Panama, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Indonesia, Syria 
Bolivia 
Columbia, Venezuela, Turkey, Greece 
Ecuador 
42423 1 Burma 
42424 1 Argentina 
424242 1 Honduras 
4242424 1 Guatemala 
43 1 Phillipines 
51 1 Kuwait 
52 1 Botswana 
53 8 Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Rhodesia, 
Tanzania, Singapore 
532 6 Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, 
Niger 
53232 1 Upper Volta 
5323232323 1 Benin (Dahomey) 
54 8 Mauritius, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Cyprus 
Malaysia, Malta, New Guinea 
542 4 Zaire, Nigeria, Somalia, Togo 
5423 1 Sierra Leone 
543 5 Cameroon, Gabon, Gambia, Mauritania, Zambia 
5432 _2 
90 
Congo (Brazzaville), Uganda 
* 
Code: 1 « No party; 2 - Military; 3 » One party; 4 » Multiparty; 5 « Colony. 
Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Constant Transition Rates. 
A. All Spells 
Destination State 
Origin State 
No party 
Military 
One party 
Multiparty 
No Party Military One Party Multiparty 
0 
0 
.001 
.016 
.046 
.033 
0 
.028 
.009 
.033 
.071 
.002 
B. First Spells Only 
No party .022 0 .002 
Military 0 0 .077 
One party 0 .034 0 
Multiparty 0 .024 .009 
Table 5. Effects on Rates of Change in Political Form. 
A. All Spells Analysis 
Constant 
GUP/CAP 
Population 
Ethnic diversity 
Region 
N 
Maximum Likelihood 
-2.765*** 
(.6963) 
-.0023*** 
(.0006) 
- .0006* 
(.0003) 
.9642** 
(.4727) 
a 
192 
Partial Likelihood 
-.0021*** 
(.0007) 
- .0006* 
(.0003) 
.8993* 
(.4792) 
192 
B. First Spells Analysis 
Constant 
GNP/CAP 
Population 
Ethnic diversity 
Region 
N 
-1.917*** 
(.3903) 
-.0030*** 
(.0008) 
- . 0012* 
(.0007) 
-.0672 
(.5334) 
b 
90 
-.0031*** 
(.0008) 
- .0011* 
(.0007) 
-.2931 
(.5548) 
b 
90 
Standard errors of estimates are shown in parentheses. 
a: Region effects, Jointly significant at the .10 level, included in model, 
b: Region effects, not jointly significant the the .10 level, not included 
in model. 
* Significant at Che .10 level. 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
*** Significant at the .01 level. 
Table 6. Effects on Movement from Specific Forms: All Spells. 
A. Maximum Likelihood Estimates. 
Origin 
Military One Party Multiparty 
Constant -1.159 -1.793** -1.959*** 
(1.518) (.7278) (.3904) 
GNP/capita -.0010 -.0053** -.0030*** 
(.0013) (.0024) (.0008) 
Population -.0004 -.0012 -.0013** 
(.0008) (.0013) (.0006) 
Ethnic diversity .9231 .1191 1.116** 
(.8993) (.8506) (.5249) 
Region a b b 
Partial Likelihood Estimates. 
Origin 
Military One Party Multiparty 
GNP/capita -.0002 -.0049** -.0028*** 
(.0008) (.0025) (.0008) 
Population -.0002 -.0010 -.0012** 
(.0008) (.0012) (.0006) 
Ethnic diversity .3143 -.2752 .9690* 
(.8271) (.9663) (.5529) 
Region c b b 
N 55 34 88 
Standard errors of estimates are shown in parentheses. 
a! Region effects, jointly significant at the .10 level, included in model, 
b: Region effects, not jointly significant at the .10 level, not included 
in model. 
c: Model with region effects could not be estimated. 
* Significant at the .10 level. 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
*** Significant at the .01 level. 
Table 7. Effects on Movement from Specific Forms: First Spells Only. 
A. Maximum Likelihood Estimates. 
Origin 
Military One Party Multiparty 
Constant d -1.929 
(1.592) 
-1.839*** 
(.4493) 
GNP/capita d -.0040 
(.0036) 
-.0031*** 
(.0010) 
Population d -.0036 
(.0052) 
-.0018 
(.0009) 
Ethnic diversity d -2.796*** 
(1.069) 
.7989 
(.6162) 
Region d a b 
Partial Likelihood Estimates. 
Origin 
Military One Party Multiparty 
GNP/capita d -.0066** 
(.0032) 
-.0033*** 
(.0010) 
Population d -.0016 
(.0028) 
-.0016 
(.0009) 
Ethnic diversity d -2.102** 
(1.139) 
.6225 
(.6460) 
Region d b b 
N 3 16 60 
Standard errors of estimates are shown in parentheses. 
a: Region effects, jointly significant at the .10 level, included in model, 
b: Region effects, not jointly significant at the .10 level, not included 
in model. 
d: Model could not be estimated due to small N. 
* Significant at the .10 level. 
** Significant the the .05 level. 
*** Significant at the .01 level. 
Table 8. Effects on Rates of Movement Into Forms: MLE. 
A. All Spells. 
Destination 
Military One Party Multiparty 
Constant -2.366*** 
(.3545) 
-5.332*** 
(.9668) 
-4.920*** 
(1.393) 
GNP/capita -.0027*** 
(.0007) 
-.0026* 
(.0016) 
-.0016 
(.8885) 
Population -.0009* 
(.0005) 
-.0021 
(.0016) 
-.0004 
(.0005) 
Ethnic diversity -.0149 
(.4887) 
3.257*** 
(1.200) 
1.659* 
(.9823) 
Region b b a 
N - 182 
B. First Spells Only • 
Destination 
Military One Party Multiparty 
Constant -1.725*** 
(.4276) 
-4.494*** 
(.6401) 
-3.666*** 
(.3132) 
GNP/capita -.0036*** 
(.0010) 
-.0011* 
(.0006) 
.0002* 
(.0001) 
Population -.0011 
(.0008) 
-.0002 
(.0003) 
-.0001 
(.0002) 
Ethnic diversity -.8696 
(.6095) 
2.023*** 
(.8504) 
-.451? 
(.6041) 
Region b b b 
N - 90 
Standard errors of estimates are shown In parentheses. 
a: Region effects, jointly significant at the .10 level, included in 
model. 
b: Region effects, not jointly significant at the .10 level, not 
included in model. 
* Significant at the .10 level. 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
*** Significant at the .01 level. 
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